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MEMORANDUM FOR: HONORABLE HENRY KISSINGER
HONORABLE FRED IKLE
HONORABLE WILLIAM E. COLBY

SUBJECT: DoD and AEC Position on Threshold Test Ban

During the past few days the Verification Panel principals have met and discussed various aspects of a possible Threshold Test Ban Treaty. To insure that there is no misunderstanding, we wish to set forth an overall DoD/AEC position on the TTB.

In our view, any change in the present limits on the testing of nuclear weapons should provide equal constraints on both the US and Soviets, and should provide for means of verification that are equitable to both sides.

For the US, the provisions must allow for the modernization of our nuclear forces, the continued certification of those nuclear forces already deployed and for the maintenance of those research, development, testing and production resources needed to safeguard the technical military capability of US deterrent forces.

The enclosure sets forth those elements which we feel meet these objectives.

T.H. Moore
6 JUN 1974

A.P. Clement
6 JUN 1974

[Signature]
JUN 7 1974

Enclosure

DOE, OSD,
DTRA,
reviews
completed.

OSD Rev No. 9

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ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

- A yield threshold that allows testing up to a design yield of 150KT.

(This corresponds to a seismic magnitude of 5.8 at our present test sites.)

- An annual quota of five (5) tests above threshold. This provision will exist for 5 years only. After five years, testing above the threshold would be allowed only following subsequent negotiations.

(This provision allows certification of the stockpile with high confidence; the development of high yield warheads for future versions of TRIDENT and MINUTEMAN and accommodation of tests which unexpectedly exceed the threshold.)

- Peaceful nuclear explosions are to be covered by any threshold test ban treaty.

- The treaty shall not enter into effect prior to 1 July 1976 nor shall the US agree to a moratorium constraining nuclear testing before the effective date of such a treaty.

- Unambiguous monitoring of treaty which ensures verifiable compliance by the Soviets.

(This will probably require: both sides deploying identical instrumentation, identical means for processing data obtained, and at least five (5) collocated seismic stations.)

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